System-Defined Roles
Every account starts with six roles that keep the most dangerous powers in a few known places, and your own roles join that tree under SYSADMIN.
The problem
Some powers can hurt the whole company: changing billing, reading every grant, creating account-wide integrations. If any custom role could hold them, nobody would know who can do what. Snowflake ships a fixed set of system roles so these powers live in a handful of well-known places.
The mental model
Picture a tree. Arrows point from child to parent, the direction the grants were made, so privileges pile up toward the top. ACCOUNTADMIN sits at the top of the account. ORGADMIN isn't part of an account's tree: its powers cover the whole organization, such as creating accounts and reading usage across them. Few people hold it, and the key fact is that it sits above accounts. PUBLIC sits under everything, because every user and role holds it automatically.
ORGANIZATION
ORGADMINcreates and lists accounts; not part of the account tree
ONE ACCOUNT
SYSTEM ROLEACCOUNTADMINtop of the account
SYSTEM ROLESECURITYADMINMANAGE GRANTS
SYSTEM ROLEUSERADMINusers and roles it owns
SYSTEM ROLESYSADMINwarehouses, databases
CUSTOM ROLEANALYST
CUSTOM ROLEDATA_ENGINEER
CUSTOM ROLEHR_ADMINno parent
SYSTEM ROLEPUBLICevery role inherits it, so it sits under every tree
each arrow: child role granted to its parent
What each role is for
| Role | What it's for | Its limit |
|---|---|---|
| ORGADMIN | Organization-level work: create and list accounts, read ORGANIZATION_ | Doesn't manage objects inside an account |
| ACCOUNTADMIN | Top of the account. Inherits SECURITYADMIN and SYSADMIN. Creates resource monitors (credit limits for warehouses), views billing, sets account parameters, creates security integrations | No practical limit inside the account, which is why it should be used rarely |
| SECURITYADMIN | Holds the global MANAGE GRANTS privilege, so it can grant and revoke any privilege. Inherits USERADMIN | Doesn't create resource monitors or view billing |
| USERADMIN | CREATE USER and CREATE ROLE. Administers the users and roles it owns | Can't change users or roles another role owns. SECURITYADMIN can step in: MANAGE GRANTS lets it transfer that ownership first |
| SYSADMIN | Creates warehouses and databases. By convention every custom role is granted to it | Can't touch objects owned by custom roles that were never granted up to it |
| PUBLIC | Granted automatically to every user and every role | Must never hold anything sensitive: a grant to PUBLIC is a grant to everyone |
Worked example: the custom-role rule
- Setup. Thomas's DATA_ENGINEER role creates
SALES_DB.CORE.ORDERS. - Symptom. Months later Youness, working as SYSADMIN, runs
ALTER TABLE orders ADD COLUMN channel STRINGand gets "Schema 'SALES_DB.CORE' does not exist or not authorized." SYSADMIN owns SALES_DB, but the schema and table belong to DATA_ENGINEER. - Cause. SYSADMIN is high in the tree, but inheritance only travels along grants that exist, and owning a database gives nothing on the schemas inside it. DATA_ENGINEER was never granted to SYSADMIN.
- Fix.
GRANT ROLE data_engineer TO ROLE sysadmin; - Result. DATA_ENGINEER stays the owner. SYSADMIN inherits its privileges, including OWNERSHIP, so it can act as the owner would, and the ALTER succeeds.
Limits and traps
Distractors on this scenario either reverse the direction ("custom roles inherit SYSADMIN's privileges") or invent a monopoly ("only ACCOUNTADMIN can alter tables"). Both are wrong. The one intended exception is HR_ADMIN. Masking and row access policies test the roles in the session, so if HR_ADMIN were granted to SYSADMIN, a SYSADMIN session would match a policy condition such as IS_ROLE_IN_SESSION('HR_ADMIN') and see salaries (Column-Level Security section). Keeping HR_ADMIN out costs nothing operationally: it owns no objects. The HR tables belong to DATA_ENGINEER, which is in the tree, so SYSADMIN can still repair them; it just sees masked values.
ACCOUNTADMIN hygiene
Give ACCOUNTADMIN to at least two people, so one lost phone can't lock the company out. Require MFA for them. Never make it anyone's default role, and never run scripts or create everyday objects with it. It still has jobs only it can do, such as creating resource monitors and security integrations. At IsmaFrost, Youness and one backup hold it, and both work day to day as SECURITYADMIN or SYSADMIN.
- ACCOUNTADMIN inherits SECURITYADMIN (which inherits USERADMIN) and SYSADMIN. The reverse is never true.
- SECURITYADMIN has MANAGE GRANTS. Only ACCOUNTADMIN creates resource monitors.
- Grant custom roles to SYSADMIN, or SYSADMIN can't manage what they build.
- Anything granted to PUBLIC is granted to every user.

